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RECENT CASES.
BENEFICIAL ASSOCIATION-MEMBERr--REUIREMEXTS-WAIVER OF FOR-
FEITURE.-MOERSCHBAECHER v. ROYAL LEAGUE, 59 N. E. 17 (Ill.).-The by-
laws of a benefit association provided that any member who engaged in the
saloon business should forfeit his beneficial rights. Although the association
received his dues knowing decedent's business, the court held that the benefici-
ary could not recover.
The decision of the appellate court, which is here affirmed, in declaring
that there was no waiver of the right of forfeiture, seems contrary to the best
authority. Forfeitures are not favored in law, and conditions limiting or
avoiding liability are strictly construed against the insurer and liberally
in favor of the assured. Ins. Co. v. Young, 86 Ala. 421 ; Ins. Co. v. Raddin,
120 U. S. 123. In principle at least, also, this decision is contrary to Ins. Co.
v. Hick, 125 Ill. 361. See Supreme Court of Honor v. Sullivan, 59 N.
B. 37 (Ind.).
COLLIsIoN ox HIGHWAY-SERVANTS--SCOPE OF AUTHORiT.-PERLSTEIN
v. Am. Exp. Co., 59 N. E. Rep. 194 (Mass.).-A servant driving his master's
team deviated from his prescribed course and negligently collided with a vehi-
cle. Held, the master was not liable for the damage.
Though in general the master is liable for an injury caused by a tool placed
in his servant's hands, as shown in Southwick v. Estes, 7 Cush. 385, yet this
rule here succumbs to the fact that the servant was acting beyond the scope of
his authority. Bowler v. O'Connell, 162 Mass. 329; Davis v. Houghtelin,
33 Neb. 582.
CONTRACTS--RECIssION-PEsToRATION OF CONSIDERATION.-YAPLE V. NfEW
YoRE 0. & W. Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 292.-In an action for injuries to the person
and property of the plaintiff, defendants having pleaded a release, the trial
judge ruled that plaintiff could not properly reply that such-release was pro-
cured by deceit, and assert that he did not know that he was signing a release
for personal injuries and that the release was only signed for injuries to the
property, without offering to restore the consideration. Held, this ruling
was incorrect.
It is a general rule that a party who seeks to rescind a contract into which
he has been induced to enter byfraud must restore to the other partywhatever
he has received by virtue of the contract. Cobb v. Hatfield, 46 N. Y. 533.
But this rule applies to those cases only where that which was received and
must be returned was the consideration or settlement which the receiver in-
tended to make, and understood he was making, and which he seeks to avoid
by reason of fraudulent practices of the other party which led him to agree toits terms. Bliss v. Railroad Co., 160 Mass. 447; Mullen v. Old Colony Rail-
road Co., 127 Mass. 86.
258
RECENT CASES. 259
CoNsTITUTrIoNAL LAW-CO-ORDINATE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT-POWER
OF PROBATE COURT To DIRECT MODE IN WHICH TELEPHONE COMPANIES
MAY USE STREETS.-CITY OF ZANESVILLE V. ZANESVILLE TELEPHONE 
AND
TELEGRAPH Co., 59 N. E. Rep. 109 (Ohio).-See. 3461, Rev. St., requires pro-
bate courts to direct the mode in which a telephone or telegraph company 
may
use the streets of a city, when the municipal authorities and the company 
are
unable to agree. Held, unconstitutional.
This case illustrates the persistency with which the law keeps 
distinct and
independent the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
the government.
Appeal of Norwalk St. Ry. Co., 38 Atl. Rep. 708; Hayburn's Case, 
2 Dall.
409. It is often difficult to distinguish legislative from judicial 
powers. A ju-
dicial act is a determination of what the existing law is, in 
relation to some-
thing already done, while a legislative act is a pre-determination 
of what the
law shall be, for the regulation of future cases. Cooley, Const. Lim., 
p. 108.
In the light of the above distinction, the legislative character of 
the power
given by the above statute becomes manifest.
CORPORATIONS- ULTRA VIRES- ADVERTISING GOODS.-VIRGIL 
V. VIRGIL
PRACTICE CLAVIER Co., 68 N. Y. Supp. 355.-A corporation organized for 
the
manufacture and sale of instruments designed for practice and 
instruction in
piano playing is not acting ultra vires when, in order to overcome 
the preju-
dice to a toneless instrument and to bring the invention to 
public notice, the
corporatiodi as a part of its general scheme maintains a piano 
school, the re-
sult of which is an increase in the monthly sales.
This case is in line with other recent decisions which go to broaden
the field of implied powers of private corporations. The cases of 
Steinway v.
Steinway & Sons, 40 N. Y. Supp. 718, and Holm v. Brewing Co., 47 
N. Y.
Supp. 518, go farther than the case at bar. The modernized doctrine is 
well
stated in Koehler v. Reinheimer, 49 N. Y. Supp. 755, where it is said: 
"So far
as the people are concerned, whether a corporation shall make one 
contract or
another, so long as it advances the purposes for which the corporation 
was
organized, is absolutely unimportant; and so the rule has come 
to be laid
down that,-except as restrained by law, trading corporations have the implied
power to make all such contracts as will further the objects of their 
creation,
and their dealings in this regard may be likened to those of an individual 
seek-
ing to accomplish the same ends."
COUNTERFEITING- FORMER CONVICTION-DISTINCT OFFENSE.- BLISS 
v.
UNITED STATES, 105 Fed. 508.-Held, counterfeiting of notes at different times
of the same series and from the same plate constitute distinct offences and 
a
conviction for one is no bar to a prosecution for the others.
This decision doubtless has good support. United States v. Rodenbush, 
8
Pet. 288. But the question is not so clearly settled as is indicated bythis 
case.
Commonwealth v. Connors, 116 Mass. 35, gives no support to the view 
that
separate issues from the same series, running through a past period of 
time,
may be divided into parts and called separate offences. A contrary view was
held in Bronch Sons Co. v. Palmer, 65 Ga. 210.
DEATH OF MINOR CHILD-RECOVERY BY PARENT-EXTENT OF DAMAGES.
-BEARMAN V. MARTHA WASHINGTON MIN. Co., 63 Pac. Rep. 631 (Utah).-In
an action by a father for the negligent killing of his minor child, the recovery is
not limited to the deprivation of the society, comfort and services of the child
during his minority, but damages may be recovered for benefits expected after
his majority.
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The common law limited such recovery to the period of the child's minori-
ty, but this law has been largely changed in many of the States by statutes
and decisions. The courts differ widely as to the measure of such damages. It
is generally held that to recover damages beyond the period of the child's mi-
nority, it must be shown that the parent is liable to be dependent and that the
minor had an intent to assist the parent after attaining his majority. Thomp-
son v. Johnston Bros., 86 Wis. 576; Ry. Co. v. Davis, 55 Ark. 462; Ry. Co. v.
Compton, 75 Tex. 667.
DEFENCE OF DWELLING HOUSE- STEAM LAUNCH WITH No SLEEPING
APARTMENTS is NOT A DWELLING.-PEOPLE v. BERNARD, 84 N. W. 1Q92
(Mich.).-Defendant owned a small steam launch which he used as a public
conveyance. It had no sleeping or living apartments, but was moored to the
dock and used as a sleeping berth by the owner. Held, that it was not a house
or castle which might be defended against entry by an officer, to the extent of
taking his life.
To render a building a dwelling house, it must be a habitation for man,
and usually occupied by some person, lodging in it at night. Scott v.
State, 62 Miss. 782.'
ELECTIONS -BALLOTS -LACK OF CERTIFICATE ON BACK-VALIDITY.-
O'CONNELL V. MA'TTHEWS ET AL, 59 N. E. Rep. 195 (Mass.).-Under a stat-
ute forbidding the deposit in the ballot-box of official ballots unless certified by
the city clerk, the petitioner asks for a mandamus to compel the rejection of
such ballots. Held, that the provisions of the statute forbidding the deposit
of such ballots does not forbid the counting of such ballots after their deposit.
The question involved is as to whether the provision of the statute is to be
considered as mandatory or directory. In general, the provisions of the Aus-
tralian ballot law are construed as mandatory. This decision, if generally
followed, would practically destroy the efficiency of the Australian system.
ELECTRIC CONDUITS IN STREETS-NEW SERVITUDE-COMPENSATION.-CO-
BuRN v. NEW TELEPHONE CO., 59 N. E. 324 (Ind.).-Held, the construction
of a sub-surface trench in sidewalk, three feet from abutter's lot line, for a con-
duit for telephone wires, is not a new servitude, entitling the abutter to
compensation.
Whether such an occupation of the street is a new use inconsistent with the
contemplated purpose of dedication, and therefore an additional servitude, or
an improved method of devoting the street to its original purpose, is a ques-
tion that has caused a wide divergence of opinion among text-writers and
courts. Lewis on Eminent Domain, Sec. 131; 2 Dillon Mun. Corp., Sec. 698a.
The Wisconsin court, in a recent decision, in which all the authorities are re-
viewed, declares the weight of judicial opinion to be in favor of the former
view. Krueger v. Telephone Co., 81 N. W. 1041, and cases cited. The latter
view, however, is also supported by the courts of many States. Pierce v.
Drew, 136 Mass. 75; People v. Eaton, 59 N. W. 145; Magee v. Overshiner,
49 N. E. 951; Julia Building Assn. v. Bell Tel. Co., 13 Mo. App. 477. The de-
cision in the case at bar is consistent with the previous adjudications of the
same Court. Magee v. Overshiner, supra.
ESTATES IN EXPECTANCY-ASSIGNMENT-VALIDITY.- FULLER V. PARMEN-
TER, 47 Atl. 1079 (Vt.).-Where son assigned expectancy in father's estate and
it appeared that father had notice and did not object, held, his assent
was unnecessary.
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The opposite rule, that assent of ancestor is necessary, was first laid down
by Chief Justice Parsons in Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass. 112, and has been
followed by other States. MeLure v. Raben, 133 Ind. 507. But the English
rule and the weight of authority in America support this decision, many cases
seeming to require neither assent nor notice. Hale v. Hollen, 90 Tex. 427;
McDonald v. McDonald, 75 Am. Dec. 434.
HUSBAND AND WiFE-NEcEssARIES-WIrE'S AGENCY.-HATCH V. LEONARD,
59 N. E. Rep. 270 (N. Y.).-Where agency was averred as ground of liability
of husband for goods furnished to his wife living separate from, and not ex-
pressly authorized by him, held, plaintiff could prove that such goods were
necessaries, since the law would imply agency from such proof.
Three judges dissented on the ground that separation precludes an implica-
tion of agency by law, citing Montague v. Benedict, 3 Barn. & C. 631. But
the dissent is amply rebutted by Baker v. Barney, 8 Johns. 72, and Goodman
v. Alexander, 165 N. Y. 289.
INJURY TO SERVANT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENcE.-McDANIELL'S ADMX.
v. LYNCHBURG COTTON MILL Co., 37 S. E. 781 (Va.).-A boy twelve years of
age, employed to sweep aisles in a cotton mill, was found dead at the foot of
the freight elevator shaft. Deceased was shown to have been active, intelli-
gent, well-grown, experienced in and competent to perform his duties-which
did not take him near the shaft-and had been repeatedly warned of the dan-
ger of playing near it. Held, sufficient to show contributory negligence on the
part of deceased, precluding recovery.
There seems to be much difference of opinion as to whether or not a minor
employ6 can be guilty of contributory negligence. The ruling in this case is in
line with the decisions in Nagle v. Allegheny, etc., R.R. Co., 88 Pa. St. 37; Die-
trich v.Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 58 Md. 347. The opposite view is held in Hay-
croft v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 64 N. Y. 636, and in Philadelphia, etc., R. Co.
v. Spearen, 11 Wright (Pa.) 300.
INSURANCE-PoLICY-BREACH OF CONDITION.-WM. SKINNER & SONS CO.
V. HOUGHTON, 48 Atl. 85 (Md.).-An insurance policy provided that it should
be void if any change took place in the interest of the subject of insurance.
Held, that a contract for the sale of insured premises rendered the policy void.
The question here considered is a much disputed one, and is still by no
means settled. It seems well established by numerous decisions that a con-
tract for the sale of insured premises does not render void a policy which con-
tains the condition that there should be no change in the title or posses-
sion of the subject of insurance. Washington Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 32 Md. 421 ;
Forward v. Ins. Co., 142 N. Y. 382; Hill v. Mutual Protection Co., 59 Penn.
St. 474. The present case decides that "interest " is a term of wider meaning
and includes any equitable right, following Gibb v. Insurance Co., 59 Minn.
267; 13 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 234. An exactly contrary view is taken in
Erb v. German-Amer. Ins. Co., 98 Iowa 606. This contrary view is, also,
strongly stated in Richards on Insurance, p. 157.
JOINT TORT-FEASORS-WHERE ONE IS A STRANGER TO A RELEASE or AN-
OTHER.-O'SHEA V. N. Y. C. & St. L. R. Co., 105 Fed. Rep. 559 (IU.).-While
one joint tort-feasor may avail himself of a release of the other, he is a stranger
to the instrument within the meaning of the term as used in the rule that in a
suit between a party to a contract and a stranger thereto, neither is concluded
by the writing, but either may contradict it by parol evidence.
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This decision is an eminently satisfactory solution of a mooted question of
law. The cases holding to the contrary (Brown v. City of Cambridge, 3 Allen
474; Goss v. Ellison, 136 Mass. 503.; Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, 41 Pac. Rep. 501),
seem to improperly assume that one joint tort-feasor is a party to a contract
of release of another, when in fact he may have been entirely ignorant of it.
LETTERS-IMMATERIAL CORRESPONDENCE-BEST EVIDENCE. - KNAPP V.
WING, 47 Atl. 1075 (Vt.).-Where the correspondence contained in letters is
immaterial, and it is sought only to show the subject upon which they were
written, the letters need not be produced as the best evidence.
This case, while an apparent exception to the general rule that in all cases
the best evidence must be produced, might better be considered as falling unrder
the rule that where the writing is not in issue, but merelycollateral to it, parol
evidence may be given covering the contents of the- writing. Coonrod v.
Madden, 126 Ind. 197.
LIFE INSURANCE-CAUSE OF DEATH-EXECUTION FOR CRIME.-BuRT ET AL
V. UNION CENT. LIFE INS. Co., 105 Fed. 419.-Held, that an action cannot be
maintained to recover on a life insurance policy, where the insured was con-
victed of a capital crime and executed pursuant to the sentence of a court hay-
ing jurisdiction, even though it was alleged that such conviction was erroneous.
It was held in Society v. Bolland, 4 Bligh (N. R.) 194, 211, and in Retter
v. Ins. Co., 169 W. S. 139, that a policy on the life of one executed for a capital
crime was void on the ground of public policy. Here the court has extended
the doctrine by declaring that even though the insured were innocent or insane
as alleged, yet that fact could not be entertained after his execution, because it
would tend to wager on the miscarriage of justice.
MARRIAGE-LEGITIMATIZED IssUE. -TOwNSEND V. VAN BUSKIRK, 68 N. Y.
Supp. 512.-Cohabitation and an agreement to live as husband and wife, to-
gether with a public acknowledgment of such relation, constitutes a valid mar-
riage and legitimatizes their offspring, in accordance with an enactment pro-
viding that illegitimate children shall be legitimatized by a subsequent inter-
marriage of their parents.
In many States, laws have been passed, providing that illegitimate child-
ren shall be legitimatized by a subsequent intermarriage of their parents, but
a legal and formal marriage has generally been regarded as necessary to bring
about such a result. The present case goes somewhat further and extends the
doctrine to the legitimatization of children by a common-law marriage.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-RAILROADS-SEMAPHORE
WIRES.-FLUTTER v. NEW YORK, C. & ST. L. R. Co., 59 N. E. 337 (Ind.).-
Plaintiff, a brakeman, running alongside train at night in the discharge of his
duties, tripped on semaphore wires stretched across track seven inches from
ground, and was injured. He was acquainted with the surroundings and with
semaphore switches. Held, defendant was liable for negligence in not provid-
ing a reasonably safe place for plaintift's work.
As a general rule, the servant who continues in employment assumes all
incidental risks of which he is aware. Deforest v. Jewett, 88 N. Y. 264. But
there are many cases in which railroad employds who knew of open culverts,
defective roadbeds, etc., but whose duties prevented them from avoiding these
defects, have recovered damages, as in this case, for not being provided a rea-
sonably safe place wherein to work. Snow v. Railroad Co., 8 Allen 441;
Gardner v. Railroad Co., 150 U. S. 349 ; Plank v. Railroad Co., 60 N. Y. 607;
Franklin v. Railroad Co., 37 Minn. 409.
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MINES AND MINING-PAROLGRANT-LCENSE-EVOCABILITY.-HOSFORDET
AL. V. METCALF ET AL., 84 N. W. 1054 (Iowa).-Held, a parol grant of min-
ing privileges in land, on the strength of which grantees expended much
money and labor in work on the premises, gave grantees an interest in the
land entitling them to continue, and which was transferable, and was not
merely a personal license and revocable.
There are a few cases which take this extreme view, but the right of the
licensor to revoke a parol license, even after much money and labor has been
expended, is very generally recognized. Kivett v. McKeithan, 90 N. C. 106;
Selden v. Delaware Co., 29 N. Y. 634. Cases cited by the court can be dis-
tinguished from the case at bar. Beatty v. Gregory, 17 Iowa 109; Bush v.
Sullivan, 3 Green 344. The statute of frauds does not permit an interest in
lands, except in a few cases-of which this is not one-to pass without a deed,
nor is such a license generally considered transferable. Cooley on Torts,
357-360.
MINING-WEIGHING COAL BEFORE SCREENING-CONTRACTS BETWEEN MIN-
ERS AND OPERATORS-CONsTITUTIONAL LAW.-IN RE PRESTON, 59 N. E. 101
(Ohio).-Habeas Corpus. Petitioner was arrested under a statute making it
a criminal offense for any mine operator, employing miners at bushel or ton
rates, to screen the coal, before it has-been weighed and credited to the em-
ploy6 sending the same to the surface. Held, such a statute is repugnant to
the bill of rights, as an unwarrantable invasion of the right to make con-
tracts. Petitioner discharged.
Statutes, not distinguishable from the one under consideration in any
substantial respect, have been held not to be within the police powers.
Millett v. People, 7 N. E. 631; Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 458, and cases
cited. Other courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion, though
not without dissenting opinions. State v. Peel Splint Coal Co., 15 S. E. 1,000;
State v. Wilson, 58 Pac. 981.
NAVIGABLE WATERS-MEANDERED LINES--EROSION-ALLUVION.-PENKER
ET AL. V. CANTER ET AL., 63 Pac. Rep. 617 (Kans.).-The plaintiff owned a
tract of land separated from a navigable stream by a tract of land owned by
the defendant. By erosion the greater part of the defendant's land was
washed away, together with a part of plaintiff's land. Subsequently the
stream receded, forming alluvion with the original boundaries of both owners.
In an action of ejectment, held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an equitable
proportion of the alluvion formed within the original boundaries of the de-
fendant's tract.
There are very few decisions on this question, but the weight of authority
supports this one. Welles v. Bailey, 55 Conn. 292; Jeffiies v. Land Co., 134
U. S. 178. In a recent New Jersey case, this view was held to be unsound.
Ocean City Assn. v. Schriver, 46 Atl. Rep. 690. This decision is unique in that
it makes equitable division of the alluvion. This seems to be unsupported by
any previous decision, though the principle is laid down in the text-books.
NOTES-SIGNATURE BY PRESIDENT-LIABILITY-PAROL PROOF.-SECOND
NATIONAL BANK V. MIDLAND STEEL Co., 58 N. E. 833 (Ind.).-A note was
signed "R. J. Beatty, President," and above the note, on the paper on which
the note was written, appeared the name of the corporation. Held, that a
note signed by the president of a corporation can be shown by parol to be the
contract of the corporation.
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There is a conflict of authority upon this point, the following holding as
above: Means v. Swormstedt, 32 Ind. 87; Bingham v. Kendall, 17 Ind. 396;
Railroad Co. v. Davis, 20 Ind. 6; Gaffv. Theis, 33 Ind. 307; Vater v. Lewis,
36 Ind. 288. Contra, Fiske v. Rldridge, 12 Gray 474 ; Hays v. Crutcher, 54
Ind. 260 ; Potts v. Henderson, 2 Ind. 327.
NUISANCES-CROPs-LANDS IN ANOTHER STATE.-DUCKTOwN SULPHUR,
&c. Co. v. BARNES, 60 S. W. Rep. 593 (Tenn.).-Where smoke from a smelter in
Tennessee injured crops on land in Georgia, held, that the action for damages
was personal, giving Tennessee jurisdiction.
This dec;sion, supported by Hobbs v. R. R. Co., 9 Heisk 873-880, shows a
tendency to abolish the old rule laid down in Roach -v. Damron, 2 Humph. 425
and Sumner v. Finegan, 15 Mass. 284, that not only actions asserting title or
interest in land, but also those arising from nuisance done to real estate are
local, and must be brought in the State where the injury is committed.
PAROL EVIDENCE-WRITTEN CONTRACT.-POTTER V. EASTON ET AL., 84
N. W. 1011.-Defendant executed three promissory notes to plaintiff, acrossthe
face of which was written "Secured by mortgage on 1 bay pacing stallion
known as Tibbeas I." As part of the same transaction they executed a chattel
mortgage to secure payment of the notes. Plaintiff brought suit on notes and
the court admitted parol evidence by the defendants to show that the horse
was unsound, thereby causing a breach of warranty which they claimed the
defendant had given. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that an admission of such
testimony was error. Court held no error.
The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter as to which
a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, if from the
circumstances of the case the court infers that the parties did not intend the
document to be a complete and final statement of the whole transaction be-
tween them, may be proved. Durkin v. Cobleigh, 156 Mass. 108. Stevens'
Digest -v., Art. 90.
PHYSICIANS-STATUTORY PROVISIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY.-STATE V. BAIR,
84 N. W. 532 (Iowa).-Code, See. 2579, requires as an alternative qualifi-
cation to practice medicine in Iowa after Jan. 1, 1899, five consecutive years'
practice in the State, three of which shall have been in one locality. Held, not
repugnant to State Constitution forbidding a great privilege or immunities to
any citizen.
The court relies on the adage, "A rolling stone gathers no moss," to sup-
port its contention that permanency of practice in one locality is a proper test
of fitness for this profession. A similar statute in New Hampshire was de-
clared unconstitutional in State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, on ground that it
was "an arbitrary discrimination."
RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENT-INuRIES TO CATTLE-FAILURE TO GIVE
SIGNALS.-GRAYBILL V. CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. Ry. Co., 84 N. W. Rep. 946
(Iowa).-The failure to observe the statutory regulation requiring a locomo-
tive approaching a crossing to ring its bell and sound its whistle is negligence
which will warrant a recovery for cattle injured by the failure to do so.
In reaching this decision the court engages in a psychological discussion as
to whether such signals are in fact a warning for animals other than man, and
holds that such signals are in fact a protection to the lower animals. The de-
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cision is in agreement with American decisions, but the true reason for such
liability is that failure to observe a statutory provision constitutes prima facie
liability. Orcutt v. Ry. Co., 24 Pac. 661.
RAILROADS-PUBLIC HIGHWAY-BASEMENTS.-KOTZ V. ILLINOS CENTRAL
R. R. Co., 59 N. E. Rep. 240 (Ill.).-Plaintiff owned a lot on Sixtieth street,
Chicago, adjoining the right of way of the defendant. Defendant, after build-
ing a surface road, elevated its tracks through Sixtieth street. Held, that a
railroad is not a public highway in the sense that the adjoining owner has an
easement of light, air, or view.
The case of Keppel v. Bailey, 1 Myl. & Kean 547, decided that a railroad,
established and existing by virtue of a charter of incorporation, is a public
highway. The above decision, however, denies those easements in a highway
which usually belong to an adjoining owner. It shows a growing tendency
to overlook small individual rights in favor of the public as a whole, or in
favor of quasi-public organizations.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-AssIGNMENT OF CLAIMS-CONTRACTS.-STILLMAN V.
DRESSER, 48 At]. Rep. 1 (R. I.).-Where an assignee of claims for services
agreed not to enforce the same against the debtor, but to have the amount de-
termined, and to assign the claim to a third party on his promise to pay for
the same, held, that the contract is an agreement to purchase a debt and not
to answer for the debt of another, and is therefore outside of the fourth section
of the Statute of Frauds.
This is an extremely close case, and the question involved is whether it is a
promise to answer for the debt of another, or a distinct and independent
promise of the promisor. The decision in this case follows a line of older prece-
dents which are still followed in somejurisdictions. Thornton v. Williams, 71
Ala. 555; Pears v. Stozry, 131 Mass. 47; Muller v. Riviere, 59 Tex. 640. But
in a large and increasing number of the United States, the promise is held to be
collateral if the original liability remains. Mitchellv. Grifin, 58 Ind. 559;
Dows v. Swett, 134 Mass. 140; Reippe v. Peterson, 35 N. W. (Mich.); Ackley
v. Parmenter, 98 N. Y. 425.
STREET RAILROADS--CoNSTRUCxION OF ROADS-CONSENT OF ABUTTING PROP-
ERTY OWNERS-CONTRACTS-VALIDITY.-MONTCLAIR MILITARY ACADEMY v.
NORTH JERSEY ST. RY. Co., 47 Atl. 890 (N. J.).-Under Acts 1894! (P. L. 1894
p. 374; 3 Gen. St. 3427), authorizing township authorities to grant the use of
streets for railroad purposes, with consent of the owners of one-half of the
abutting property, complainant avers that defendant, to obtain such consent,
agreed to deliver to him certain bonds, and after obtaining the grants and con-
structing the road, refused to deliver said bonds. Held, contract not void as
against public policy.
Contract is not void because it affects other parties or public interest.
Simpson v. Howden, 9 Clark & F. 61, 10 Adol. & E. 793, and Railway Co. v.
Hawkes, 5 H. L. Cas. 331. For contracts void as against public interest, see
Smith v. Applegate, 23 N. J. Law 352, and Brooks v. Cooper, 50 N. J. Eq. 761.
TRADE NAME-REFEREE TO RECEIVE LETTERs.-DR. DAviD KENNEDY CORP.
V. KENNEDY, 59 N. E. 133 (N. Y.).-A physician formed a corporation and sold
to it all the personal property of his business in proprietary medicine, including
the sole and absolute right to use his name in connection therewith. For a
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time he acted as president, and turned over to the corporation all letters ad-
dressed to him except those which were strictly private. Subsequently, he was
deposed as president, and a dispute arose as to who had the right to receive
and open letters addressed to him. Held, that a referee should be appointed
to receive, open and read all letters addressed to the physician, to ascertain
from iheir contents their true destination, and to distribute accordingly.
The success of the business was due to the system of advertising, of which
these patients' letters were a part. Said system was continued by the corpo-
ration with the full knowledge, consent and advice of the defendant. Plaintiff
corporation is entitled to all letters which clearly refer to the business
of the corporation, although addressed to Dr. David Kennedy. The
appointment of a referee to determine whether the letters referred to the busi-
ness of the corporation, or were private letters belonging to Dr. Kennedy,
settled the question in controversy in an unusual, perhaps, but certainly a very
equitable manner.
UNITED STATES-AcTONS AGAINST-JURISDICTION TO ENTERTAIN CROSS
LIBEL IN ADMIRALTY.-BOWKER V. UNITED STATES, 105 Fed. 398.-A govern-
ment boat collided with a private schooner. A libel was filed against the
owner of the latter, who thereupon filed a cross libel. Citation was issued
against the United States Attorney. This was resisted. Held, that cross libel
could not be maintained.
It is conceded that the United States as a sovereign authority cannot law-
fully be sued without its consent. Schillinger v. U. S., 155 U. S. 166. The
present decision, however, is directly antagonistic to The Nuestra Senora de
Regila, 108 U. S. 92, and The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, where it was held that a
claim for damages can exist against a vessel of the- United States, and that
this claim can be enforced as soon as the United States by affirmative action
becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the court. In Pt. Royal and A. R. R. v.
State of South Carolina, 60 Fed. 552, it was there decided that when a State
voluntarily comes into court her standing before the court is that of an indi-
vidual, and a cross bill against her will be sustained if it contains matter rele-
vant to the original bill.
UNIVERSITIES-USE OF NAME-INUNCTION.-COMMONWEALTH v. BANKS,
48 Atl. Rep. 277 (Pa.).-Where a business college was denominated "Univer-
sity of Philadelphia," thereby causingitself to be mistaken for the University of
Pennsylvania, held, an injunction will lie against the use of the name.
This case shows a marked extension of the border line between names held
apt and not apt to deceive the public. Potter v. McPherson, 21 Hun. 559,
gives the decision support; but in the light of Snowden v. Noah, 14 Am. Dec.
547, and Foster v.Webster, etc., Co., 13 N. Y. Supp. 338, it seems an encroach-
ment upon the field of cases not apt to deceive.
WiLLs-REvIVAL-INTENT.-IN RE GOULD'S WILL, 47 At. 1082 (Vt.).-
Gould in 1880 made his will and gave it to his son to keep. In 1896 he made
a second will, revoking the former. Later, he burned the second in son's pres-
ence, remarking that he wanted the first will "to go exactly as it says." Held,
the first will revived.
The authorities differ as to whether the prior will is revived by the mere
act of destroying the revoking will. Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, and others,
hold that republication is necessary for revival. Randall v. .Beatty, 31 N. J.
Eq. 643, sets forth the contrary opinion. The court here followed the ruling
of Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, that the intent at the time of the destruc-
tion of the revoking will governs.
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WITNESSES-MIsTAKEN TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT NO CAUSE FOR REVER-
SAL ON REVIEW.-CAREY V. STATE, 60 S. W. 550 (Tex.).-Upon a trial for lar-
ceny of cattle, defendant testified under a mistake and misapprehension of the
question propounded to him by the county attorney, that he had no authority
to execute the bill of sale for said cattle. Held, that it was no ground for re-
versal on review.
While there are no cases directly supporting this decision, it is no doubt
considered as against public policy that one be allowed to take advantage of
his own alleged mistake.
